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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 7413 
FRED MATTER!, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the late afternoon of Friday, May 6th, 1949, the 
body of a dead man, partly submerged in water, later identified 
as Levi P. Delk, was discovered by two minors in Little Cotton-
wood Creek, in the vicinity of Pepper's Hill, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. An examination of the body by the coroner disclosed 
a laceration about seven inches in length on the back of the 
left side of the head, and numerous bruises and abrasions lo-
cated on the forehead, nose, right eye, right knee, and left 
leg (Tr. 88, 126). 
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The body of the dead man was dressed in a khaki colored 
shirt, a brown suit coat, a pair of shorts, and a pair of shoes 
(Tr. 121). The trousers and socks were not on the body (Tr. 
124, 125). An examination of the clothing disclosed a bank 
book bearing the name of Levi P. Delk, army discharge papers, 
and other miscellaneous papers in the inside coat pocket (Tr. 
124). In the outside coat pocket, there was a key to the 
ignition switch of an automobile later identified as the key to 
the Willy's panel truck (Exhibit "H," Tr. 125) owned by the 
deceased, and also a small vial containing an unindentified 
liquid. This vial was later destroyed when dropped by a deputy 
in the sheriff's office. 
No definite time was established as to when the deceased 
met his death (Tr. 91), and the testimony as to how the de-
ceased died was very conjectural in nature, the doctor who, 
examined the body merely having ventured an opinion that 
the head-wound described above was inflicted by a blunt in-
strument of some sort ( T r. 90). . But there was no evidence 
of any blunt instrument, or for that matter, of any kind of 
an instrument which might have caused the wound. 
About ten o'clock A .. M:. on Saturday, April 30th, 1949, 
a person, later identified as Fred Matteri, the Defendant, ap-
peared before a notary public in Salt Lake City, Utah, and, 
representing himself to be Levi P. Delk, signed a certificate of 
title to a Willy's panel truck, identified at the trial as owned 
by Delk (Tr. 167). Later, the same morning, the Defendant, 
still representing himself to be Levi P. Delk, sold the said 
Willy's panel truck to Arch Browning, Inc., a car dealer of 
Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 207-212). No ignition key to the 
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truck was delivered to the car dealer at the time of the sale, 
and it was disclosed at the trial that the ignition wires had been 
crossed to raake possible the operation of the truck without 
the key (Tr. 218, 221). 
Between the 1st and 3rd days of May, 1949, the Defendant 
attempted to sell a Waltham pocket watch to his fellow work-
ers, which watch was identified as once having belonged to 
Delk, and \Yas last seen in Delk's possession in February, 1949 
(Tr. 249). Unable to make the sale, the Defendant later 
pawned it to the National Loan Company of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for the sum of $7.50. 11atteri used his own name when 
he pawned the watch, which had a chain on it at the time of 
pawning (Tr. 23 7, 246). The chain never was positively 
identified as owned by Delk at any time (Tr. 250, 251). 
There was evidence that a gold-plated corn cutter, at one 
time used by Delk as a watch fob (Tr. 250, 253), was found in 
an open field some distance to the south of the building which 
contained the three apartments in the tourist park (Tr. 294). 
The corn cutter fob had been taken from among 1800 that 
Delk had made up for sale to his patients, and was specially 
gold-plated for his personal use. 
The evidence showed that Mr. Delk, during the month of 
April, 1949, had occupied parking space in a tourist and trailer 
park at 3115 South State Street, Salt Lake County, owned and 
operated by Mr. and ~Irs. L.A. Christensen. At the same time, 
Mr. and Mrs. Matteri and family occupied a tourist apartment 
in the same court, J\1rs. Matteri and the children having mr;ved 
away about April 20th, leaving Matteri there alone. The 
apartment occupied by Matteri was the eastern unit of a build-
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ing containing three units, the center and the west units being 
unfinished and unoccupied. The building faced south, and the 
southwest corner of it was approximately 65 feet southe1st of 
the space occupied by Delk with his truck (Exhibit "Q"). 
The last Mr. Delk was seen alive was about 5 or 6 p.m. on 
Friday, April 29th, when he came into the tourist park in his 
truck, and parked it in the rented space. He was not missed 
by Mr. and Mrs. Christensen until Sunday, as they understood 
he was going fishing (Tr. 140, 180, 203). 
A pair of glasses identified as belonging to Mr. Delk was 
found in front of the center apartment of the building con-
taining the three units (Tr. 180). The said center apartment 
was examined on May 9th by representatives of the Sheriff's 
office, at which time two spots on the floor, reddish brown in 
color, appearing like blood, were found. One spot was dried, 
and the other was still moist, being mixed with what definitely 
appeared to be vomit, as determined by the smell. Shavings, 
sawdust, papers and other debris were on the floor. The apart-
ment had markings also on the floor, indicating that a struggle 
of some kind has taken place therein (Tr. 259-297). 
There was a total lack of evidence connecting Matteri, 
personally, with Delk, personally, between the time Delk was 
last seen alive, and the time his body was discovered in the 
creek. No weapon was discovered to connect up the Defendant. 
Matteri' s fmg.:;:rprints were not found on the doorknob nor 
anywhere else in the center apartment which the State con-
tended was the scene of the alleged homicide (Tr. 338, 345). 
No evidence of blood was found on Matteri's clothing. Also, 
no evidence was produced of trouble between Matteri and 
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Delk of any kind, such as quarrels, ill-will, threats, bad feelings, 
or revenge. 
On 1-fay 8th, Mr. :Niatteri was arrested and charged with 
murder in the first degree. In the bill of particulars ( Tr. 12) 
furnished the Defendant by the State, Defendant was charged, 
first, with having killed Delk with deliberation, premeditation, 
and with malice aforethought, and second, with having killed 
Delk in the course of committing a robbery, or an attempted 
robbery, to which the Defendant pleaded "not guilty." 
After the State closed its case at the trial, the Defendant 
moved for a dismissal of the first degree murder charge, for 
insufficient evidence. This, the court denied (Tr. 382, 384). 
The defense then rested, and moved for a directed verdict 
of not guilty on the first degree murder charge, and the included 
charges of murder in the second degree and voluntary man-
slaughter. The motion was denied (Tr. 386). 
The jury was instructed by the Court, the defense taking 
exception to the Court's refusal to give Defendant's Proposed 
Instruction No. XII (Tr. 389). The State and defense made 
their arguments to the jury, which thereupon retired to consider 
its verdict. After several hours of deliberation, the jury re-
turned for further instructions, the defense objecting to addi-
tional comments made by the trial court to the jury at that tin1.e 
(Tr. 391-393). After a short deliberation, the jury returned 
with a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, with a 
recommendation of life imprisonment (Tr. 54). 
The defense then moved for a new trial, which motion 
was denied (Tr. 397). The Court, disregarding the recom~ 
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mendation of leniency made by the jury, sentenced the De-
fendant to be executed by shooting (Tr. 403). 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The trial · COIJrt erred in denying Defendant's motion 
to dismiss the charge of firs,t 9~egree, murder, for the reason 
that the State did not produce sufficient evidence to sustain 
. the charge. 
2. The trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion 
.to instruct the jury to find the ·Defendant not guilty of first 
degree murder, for the reason that the State did not introduce 
~ufficient evidence of first degree murder to submit to the jury. 
3. The trial court erred. in_ denying Defendant's motion 
to instruct the jury to find the Defendant not guilty of second 
degree murder, for the reason that the State did not introduce 
sufficient evidence of second degree murder to submit to the 
Jury. 
4. The trial court erred in refusing to give the jury De-
fendant's proposed instruction No. XII (Tr. 31), and in giving 
in lieu thereof, the third paragraph of its Instruction No. 7 
(Tr. 36) ,. contrary to the provisions of Section 105-32-5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943. 
5. The trial court erred in giving the jury Instruction No. 
8 (Tr. 36, 3 7), for the reason that said instruction was a 
definition of murder, and there was no evidence of murder to 
submit to the jury. 
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6. The trial court erred in giving the jury Instruction No. 
9 (Tr. 3 7, 38), for the reason that said instruction defined first 
and second degree murder, and there was no evidence of either 
to submit to the jury. 
7. The trial court erred in giving the jury Instruction No. 
10 (Tr. 38, 39), for the reason that said instruction set forth 
the elements of first degree murder as they pertain to this 
case, and there was ~nsufficient evidence of the same to submit 
to the jury. 
8. The trial court erred in giving the jury Instruction No. 
11 ( T r. 39) , for the reason that said instruction set forth the 
elements of second degree murder as they pertain to this case, 
and there was insufficient evidence of the same to submit to 
the jury. 
9. The trial court erred in commenting to the jury, when 
they sought additional instructions, that he had means of in-
vestigating the Defendant, or any story the Defendant told 
or any statement the Defendant made, and that the court's 
investigation would determine whether the court would impose 
a life sentence or the death penalty (Tr. 391-393), for the rea-
sen that the jury was misled thereby. 
10. The trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion 
for a new trial, which refusal is contrary to law. 
11. The trial court abused its discretion in ignoring the 
jury's recommendation of a life sentence, and in sentencing 
the Defendant to be executed. 
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ARGUMENT NO. I 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF FIRST DEGREE MUR-
DER AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
The information in this case charges that the Defendant, 
Fred Matteri, committed the crime of murder in the first de-
gree, by murdering Levi P. Delk. The Bill of Particulars (Tr. 
12) furnished the Defendant by the State reads as follows: 
"That at the time and place alleged in the Information, 
the defendant willfully, deliberately and with the intent to kill 
Levi P. Delk, and with malice aforethought and premeditation 
killed Levi P. Delk by striking the said Levi P. Delk over the 
head with a blunt instrument, the nature and description of 
which is unknown to the District Attorney: 
"That at the time and place alleged in the Information, 
the defendant killed Levi P. Delk while the said Defendant 
was perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate the crime of 
robbery in that the said defendant at said time and place was 
feloniously taking or attempting to take personal property in 
the possession of or in the immediate person of Levi P. Delk, 
that the said taking or attempting to take said property was 
against the will of the said Levi P. Delk and was accomplished 
or attempted to be accomplished by means of force and fear; 
that said personal property consisted of a truck, a watch and 
other personal property, the exact nature and description of 
which is unknown to the District Attorney." 
At the conclusion of the State's case, the Defendant moved 
that the charge of first degree murder be dismissed, which 
motion \vas denied (Tr. 382-384). After the Defendant rested, 
10 
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the Defendant moved that the jury be directed to find a verdict 
of not guilty of murder in the first degree, which motion also 
was denied by the Court (Tr. 386). However, even the Court 
was convinced that the State had not made out a case of murder 
in the course of a robbery or attempted robbery, as set out in 
the second paragraph of the bill of particulars quoted above 
(Tr. 383), and submitted the case to the jury solely on the 
charge of first degree murder as set forth in the first paragraph 
of said bill of particulars as above contained. 
In the instant case, to make out murder in the first degree, 
it is necessary that the State prove, among other elements dis-
puted by the Defendant and dealt with elsewhere in this argu-
ment, that the Defendant killed Delk with malice aforethought, 
that the killing v:as deliberate and with premeditation, and the 
result of a specific intention on the part of Defendant to kill 
Delk. If the State failed to prove any one of the foregoing 
elements, then no first degree murder charge was made out. 
Please see State vs. Russell, a Utah case, 145 Pac. ( 2) 1003. 
The Defendant contends, however, that there was abso-
lutely no evidence of premeditation, deliberation, nor of malice 
aforethought, nor of a specific intent on the part of the De-
fendant to kill Delk, nor of other elements of first degree 
murder, and that as a result, the State failed to make out its 
case. 
(A) When we speak of "deliberation," "premeditation," 
and "malice aforethought," and "specific intent," we are speak-
ing of the state of mind, the mental attitude or intent of the 
accused formed prior to the commission of a homicide. Not 
11 
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being able to probe the mind itself, such state of mind must 
of necessity be determined by actions of the accused. 
In State vs. Russell, supra, this Court very ably discussed 
the state of mind as related to first and second degree murder, 
and distinguished between the two. This Court, in that case, 
held that malice aforethought, being an essential element in 
murder at the common law, was adopted by our criminal code 
as a necessary element, but that in order to make out murder 
in the first degree, the killing itself, not merely the malice, must 
be with deliberation and premeditation. The lack of delib-
eration and premeditation in the killing itself, the other ele-
ments of murder being present, would reduce the homicide to 
second degree murder. 
In the Russell case supra, this Court said: 
" ... The terms p1'emeditation and afo1'ethought both 
mean to think out, plan or design beforehand. Some courts 
make a slight distinction between those terms and the term 
deliberation, holding that it requires more calmness of mind 
and cooll)ess of blood for deliberation than merely to pre-
meditate and think out beforehand, but other courts refuse 
to make such a distinction." 
The Russell case, in speaking of murder in the first degree 
requiring a "willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated 
killing," says: 
"This simply means that the fatal blow must be struck 
after deliberately and premeditatedly forming a specific inten-
tion or design to kill." 
12 
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These are universal principles, and are subscribed to by 
1 Warren on Homicide, Sections 70 and 71; 1 Wharton's 
Criminal Law, 12th Ed., Sections 506, 507, 515, 516, 517, and 
Section 420 at page 631; together with many other references 
contained in the Russell case. 
Keeping in mind that in this case, we are concerned with 
the state of mind of ~Iatteri before and at the time the alleged 
fatal blow was struck (there being no evidence that Matteri 
struck the fatal blow), what evidence is there of such a state 
of mind? The state of mind is determined by the actions of 
the accused prior to, and at the time of the commission of 
the act wit., which it is connected. In searching the record, 
we find absolutely no acts of Matteri's prior to the alleged 
homicide which show any state of mind whatsover in relation 
to Delk. There were no acts of preparation, no securing or 
selecting of weapons, no lying in wait; there were no boasts, 
no threats, no arguments, nor other difficulties between the 
accused and Delk. 
In substance, the evidence was that Delk was found dead 
with a gash on the back of his head several days after the 
alleged killing; Matteri was in possession of Delk's truck and 
his watch, he having sold the truck by representing himself 
as Delk, and having pawned the watch in his own name. But 
these are events which occurred after the alleged homicide, and 
could not possibly show any state of mind whatsoever that may 
have existed many hours earlier. These facts show neither 
premeditation, deliberation, malice aforethought, nor specific 
intent; for that matter, neither do they show heat of passion, 
reckless disregard of life, negligence, nor self-defense. In fact, 
13 
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it is impossible to conceive of a case wherein there could be less 
evidence of a condition of the mind at a given time. 
The only actions of an accused after an alleged homicide 
which would show a state of mind existing at or before the 
killing, would be statements or confessions of such accused. 
These are totally lacking in this case. 
The absence of evidence of the state of mind of one accused 
of murder in the first degree is discussed in People vs. Howard, a 
California case, 295 Pac. 333. In that case, there was evidence of 
a homicide implicating the Defendant, but except for a purport-
ed confession, there was no evidence of the state of mind of the 
accused. The Court said: 
"To be murder of the first degree, under our statute, the 
killing must be premeditated, except when done in the perpe-
tration of certain felonies; that is to say, the unlawful killing 
must be accompan:.ed with a deliberate and clear intent to take 
life. If the act be preceded by, and be the result of, a con-
currence of will, deliberation and intent, the crime of first-
degree murder is proved. People vs. Bellon, 180 Cal. 706, 
182 P. 420. When the killing is proved to have been com-
mitted by the defendant, and nothing further is sho\v'n, the 
presumption of law is that it was malicious and an act of mur-
der; but in such a case the verdict should be murder of the 
second degree, and not murder of the first degree. People vs. 
Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 6, 11 Pac. 793; People vs. Ford, 85 Cal. App. 
258, 263, 258 P. 1111. 
"In the present case, the prosecution relied principally on 
the defendant's confession to prove his connection with the 
14 
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offense. H the confession be disregarded, the record is enti1'ely 
destitute of evidence tending to establish the circumstancgs and 
conditions actually existing just pri01· to and at the time of 
the striking of the fatal blow. (Italics ours). If, as urged by 
the people, the jury in weighing and considering the evtdence 
might properly reject as untrue that portion of the confession 
wherein defendant charged the decedent with having been the 
aggressor in a quarrel which led up to the homicide, there re-
mains no evidence from which it might reasonably be deduced 
that the killing was the result of a willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated intent to kill. \V e do not question the propriety 
of the jury's action in rejecti:1g any· portion of the defendant's 
evidence or confession which to it was unworthy of belief. 
However, if it be assumed that this was done in the present 
case, there is a dearth of evidence tending to show the condi-
tions as they existed at the time of the homicide, and from 
which it might reasonably .be held that the murder was, in fact, 
willful, premeditated, and intentional. In this regard, the 
state failed to satisfy the burden of proof.'' 
Applying the rule of the Howard case here, "the record 
is ent~Iely destitute of evidence tending to establish the cir-
cumstances and conditions actually existing just prior to and 
at the time of the striking of the fatal blow." 
Thus, under the law as contained in the Russell and How-
ard cases, the State in the instant case produced no evidence 
whatsoever of premeditation, deliberation, malice aforethought 
or specific intent to kill Delk, the lack of any one of these 
elements being fatal to the State's case. Consequently, there 
·was nothing to submit to the jury insofar as first degree mur-
15 
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der was concerned, and the trial court should have either dis-
missed that charge, or directed the jury to bring in verdict of 
not guilty to such charge. 
(B) There is another criterion which definitely rules out 
first degree murder in this case. 
Section 103-28-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides 
that malice may be express or it may be implied. In 1 Warren 
on Homicide, paragraph 67, at page 276, express and implied 
malice are discussed as they relate to first degree murder. 
Therein, the author states the law to be that express malice 
is absolutely essential to murder in the first degree, implied 
malice reducing the crime to murder in the second degree. 
In paragraph 68, Warren defines express malice in this 
manner: 
"Express malice is where the killing is the product of a 
sedate deliberate mind and formed design. It exists when 
there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take 
the life of a fellow creature, or to do him some gr:at bodily 
harm from which death might result ... A design to kill, or 
to inflict serious bodily harm, endangering life, though with-
out lawful excuse or justification, and though fully formed and 
fixed in the mind, is not express malice without such design 
having an inception and origin in a sedate, delib~rate mind." 
Then Warren defines "a sedate, deliberate mind" as a 
"mental condition sufficiently composed, calm, and undis-
turbed to admit of reflection on the design to kill, or to inflict 
bodily harm endangering life, and to comprehend the nature 
and probably consequences of the act designed." 
16 
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On the other hand, Warren, in Section 69 at page 285, 
defines implied or constructive malice, as "not a fact, but an 
inference or conclusion founded upon the particular facts 
and circumstances of the case as they are ascertained to exist. 
It means that the fact has been attended with such circumstances 
as carry with them the plain indication of a malevolent and 
diabolical spirit; and it is inferred from any deliberate cruel 
act committed by one person against another; from the in-
tentional doing of an unlawful or wrongful act with a wrongful 
purpose.'' 
It is evident from the discussion of deliberation, premedi-
tation and aforethought, as they relate to the evidence in this 
case, and as discussed above, that there is no express malice 
under Warren's definition, inasmuch as evidence of the ac-
cused's state of mind at the time of the alleged homicide just 
does not exist. There just is no evidence that Matteri killed 
Delk with a sedate deliberate mind, or that he even struck the 
fatal blow. Thus, malice, if it existed at all in this case, could 
not possibly be more than implied. 
Consequently, in applying Warren's rule, supported by 
the cases therein cited, there is a total absence of express malice 
in the instant case. Thus, for this reason also, the State 
failed to make out a case of murder in the first degree, and, as 
a result, there was insufficient evidence for the case to have 
been submitted to the jury. 
(C) In addition, not only has the State failed to make 
out deliberation, premeditation, malice aforethought, specific 
intent to kill Delk, and express malice, it also has failed to pro-
duce evidence that the killing was at the hands of Matteri. 
17 
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Evidence connecting Matteri, personally, with Delk, per-
sonally, at the time of the alleged offense, or at any other time, 
for that matter, just does not exist. There was no evidence 
that Matteri took the truck from the physical possession or 
presence of Delk. The fact that the wires were crossed on the 
ignition to enable its operation (Tr. 218, 221), and the further 
fact that Delk, when his body was discovered in the creek, 
had the ignition switch key in his pocket, (Tr. 125 and Ex-
hibit "H") would indicate that no physical contact was had 
between Matteri and Delk in regard to the truck. 
At the time Delk' s body was found in the creek, there was 
. no evidence that his pockets or their contents had been disturbed 
in the least. He had on no trousers (Tr. 124, 125), so there 
is no evidence that the wa~ch, a pocket model, had been re-
moved from his person. In fact, the last time the watch was 
established to have been in his possession was in February 
( T r. 249) , almost three months earlier. 
There was an absolute lack of evidence that Delk and 
l\!Iatteri had been seen together during the interval in ques-
tion, or at any other time. Consequently, nothing in the record 
connects these parties, physically, during the period of time 
the alleged homicide took place. In fact, the crossed wires 
on the truck, and the ignition key being on the dead body, 
would tend to negative any personal connection between the 
two parties. 
The dark spots on the floor of the apartment next to that 
occupied by 1vfatteri were not proved to contain human blood, 
as the tests were inconclusive. True, blood on a paint stick 
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and on a small piece of brown paper, found in the apartment, 
had blood type A on them, which was the same type as that 
of Delk (Tr. 319, 329). But this classification extended only 
to these two samples. However, Mr. Duncan, the F. B. I. 
laboratory technician, testified that 42 per cent of the people 
of the country were of the same blood type (Tr. 328). It 
is only by bare supposition that the blood on the paint stick 
and brown paper was Delk's. 
Thus, it was not established that the alleged homicide took 
place in the center apartment as theorized by the State. And 
even though one concludes that it did, there is still a total 
lack of evidence connecting Matteri with the apartment. 
Matteri' s fingerprints were not on the doorknob, nor elsewhere 
in the apartment (Tr. 338, 345). Not only was there no 
weapon produced by the State, but also lacking were finger-
prints of the accused on any weapon. The key to the apart-
ment was of the commonest variety (Tr. 142, 146-148), so 
that the apartment was read.i.ly accessible to many persons besides 
the accused. Consequently, the State failed, completely, to 
tie Matteri in with the killing. 
If, as the State contended, the homicide was committed 
by the accused in the apartment next to his, someone must 
· have moved the body to the creek, and it is only reasonable to 
assume that it was done by the assailant. But in doing so, 
the assailant would have had tell-tale blood on his clothing. 
However, there was no such evidence on that of Matteri's. 
Thus, to summarize Argument No. 1, only the following 
conclusions can be reached: 
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The elements of premeditation, deliberation, malice afore-
thought, and specific intent to kill Delk, absolutely necessary 
to first degree murder, are totally lacking. 
Malice, if it existed at all, was only implied, the universal 
legal requirement being express, in order to constitute first 
degree murder. 
There was a complete lack of evidence connecting the 
person of Matteri with the person of Delk at the time of the 
alleged homicide, or at any other time. 
The State, having failed to establish the foregoing ele-
ments, or any one of them, did not make out a case of first 
degree murder, and for that reason, the trial court should have 
dismissed the charge of first degree murder, or should have 
instructed the jury to bring in a verdict of not guilty of the 
same. Having done neither, the trial court should have granted 
Defendant's motion for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT NO. 2 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF SECOND DEGREE 
MURDER AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
In the Russell case, supra, which clearly states the law of 
murder in the first and second degrees, this Court discusses 
statutory and common law murder, stating in effect that the 
provisions of Section 103-28-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
adopted the common law definition of murder. This Court 
then went on to say that those common law murders in which 
the killing itself is the result of deliberation and premeditation, 
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or which are committed in the perpetration of one of the four 
named felonies, are murder in the first degree. All other homi-
cides which are murder under the common law, are murders 
in the second degree. 
The Court then said: 
"In order to have the necessary malice. to commit murder 
(not necessarily murder in the first degree), the killing must 
be unlawful, it must result from or be caused by an act or omis-
sion to act committed with one of the following intentions: 
( 1) An intention or design previously formed to kill or cause 
great bodily injury; or (2) an intention or design previously 
formed to do an act or omit to do an act, knowing the reason-
able and natural consequences thereof would be likely to 
cause death or great bodily injury; or ( 3) a previously thought 
out intentional or designed perpetration or attempt to perpe-
trate one of ·certain kinds of felonies. This is not limited to 
arson, rape, burglary and robbery mentioned in Sec. 103-28-3, 
U. C. A. 1943, but it does not include all felonies. 1 Warren 
on Homicide, Sees. 62, 71 to 76, 78 and 79; 1 Wharton's Crimi-
nal Law, 12th Ed., Sections 420, 421, 447, 504, 507, 509 to 
512, and 515 to 518; 2 Brill's Cyc. of Criminal Law, Sections 
619 to 636; People vs. Davis, supra (8 Ut. 412, 32 P. 670); 
People vs. Halliday, supra (5 Ut. 467, 17 P. 118)." 
Insofar as the instant case is concerned, that part of No. 
( 1) above referring to a design or intention to kill, which 
would show first degree murder, has been disposed of in Argu-
ment No. 1. Thus, we have remaining that part of ( 1) refer-
ring to an "intention or design previously formed" to "cause 
great bodily injury," and in (2) above, the question whether 
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there was "an intention or design previously formed to do an 
act or omit to do an act, knowing the reasonable and natural 
consequences thereof would be likely to cause death or great 
bodily injury." The trial court, in referring to second degree 
murder, submitted the case to the jury on these two proposi-
tions (Tr. 39, Instruction No. 11, paragraph 3). From these 
quotations from the Russell case, should either ( 1) or ( 2) be 
proved, along with the other elements of second degree murder, 
then the State has made out its case. 
The foregoing references to the Russell case are really 
dealing with malice aforethought. On this point, the Russell 
case further states: 
"The statute requires not only that the killing be done 
with malice, but that the malice must have been 'aforethought.' 
This simply means the malice was thought out before hand, 
or previously planned or designed or premeditated. 1 Warren 
on Homicide, Sec. 79 'Deliberation and Premeditation'; 1 
Wharton's Criminal Law, 12th Ed., Sections 421 and 507; 2 
Brill's Cyc. of Criminal Law, Sec. 617." 
As set forth in Argument No. 1 herein, when we speak 
of intention, premeditation, deliberation, and afot'ethought, 
we are speaking of a state of mind. In this connection, the 
state of mind with which we are concerned is that existing 
before and at the commission of an act. However, according 
to the Howard case, supra, it is the actions of the accused at 
such times which evidence his state of mind. 
Now let us consider the facts of this case. As pointed out 
in Argument No. 1, there are no actions whatsoever of Matteri's 
which evidence any state of mind at the time of the alleged 
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homicide. In fact, we do not even know with any definiteness 
when the alleged killing actually did take place. The only 
evidence we have is that lviatteri had possession of the truck 
and watch, and that he sold the former representing himself 
as Delk, and pawned the latter in his own name. But these are 
not actions that are prior to, or concurrent with the alleged 
homicide. Thus, they do not show any state of mind whatso-
ever that may have occurred at the time of the alleged homicide, 
as pointed out in the Howard case. 
But this is not all. Most important is the complete lack 
of evidence that Matteri's possession bf the truck and watch 
was connected in time and place with the alleged assault. As 
pointed out in Argument No. 1 herein, there is not only a total 
lack of evidence connecting the victim and the accused, but the 
crossed wires on the truck show a disconnection between the 
two persons. The lack of trousers on Delk show a disconnec-
tion also in regard to the pccket model watch. Thus, there 
is a total absence of evidence that 11atteri was the one who 
committed the assault. 
To recapitulate: The State has failed to produce any 
evidence showing an intention or design previously formed 
to cause great bodily injury; it failed to produce evidence of 
an intention or design previously formed to do an act, knowing 
the reasonable and natural consequences thereof would be 
likely to cause death or great bodily injury; and it has failed 
to produce evidence that any assault whatsoever was com-
mitted by the accused. 
Consequently, the only conclusion that can be reached 
is that the State has completely failed to make out either malice 
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or aforethought, required by ( 1) and (2) quoted above from 
the Russell case, and has failed to connect Matteri with an 
alleged assault, which allegedly resulted in Delk's death. 
Insofar as ( 3) is concerned in the quotation from the 
Russell case, even the trial court did not think there was suffi-
cient evidence of robbery, or of any other felony, for that 
matter, to go to the jury (Tr. 383). Thus, no felony has been 
established to bring the case within the requirements of murder 
in the second degree. 
Therefore, the State did not make out a case of second 
degree murder against Matteri, and the trial court should have 
instructed the jury to bring in a verdict of not, guilty >f this 
charge, as moved by the Defendant. The trial court, having 
failed to grant this motion, should have granted Defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT NO. 3 
THE TRIAL COURT MISDIRECTED THE JURY IN 
MATTERS OF LAW. 
We next turn our attention to erroneous instructions given 
to the jury by the trial court. 
(A) The Defendant requested the trial court to instruct 
the jury as follows (Defendant's requested Instruction No. 
XII, Tr. 31): 
"If you find from the evidence that the Defendant has 
committed a public offense and there is reasonable ground of 
doubt in which of two or more degrees he is guilty, under the 
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law of this state you must find him guilty of the lowest of 
such degrees only." (Italics ours.) 
In requesting this instruction, the Defendant followed 
substantially the wording of Section 105-32-5, Utah Code An-
notated 1943. 
However, the trial court refused to use the word must, 
which is the language of the statute, but use the word ccm 
(Instruction No. 7, Tr. 36), to which the Defendant excepted 
(Tr. 389). 
The defense contends that these two words are not inter-
changeable, as they do not convey the same or similar meaning. 
According to Webster "can" means to have ability, skill, knowl-
edge, capacity ,or means. But "must" means compulsion, re-
quirement or necessity. 
Thus, the trial court in using can, instructed the jury that 
it had ability, skill, knowledge, capacity or means to find the 
Defendant guilty of the lowest of such degrees. But the 
statute referred to provides, in using the word must, that the 
jury is compelled to, required to, or of necessity should find 
the Defendant guilty of the lowest of such degrees. In other 
words, by the L.'lstruction as given, the jury could not under-
stand that it was compelled or required to bring in a verdict 
of the lowest degree, should there be reasonable doubt m 
which of two or more degrees Defendant was guilty. 
Consequently, the trial court not ?nly committed error .in 
using can in place of must, but the jury was misled thereby. 
(B) It is the position of the Defendant that, inasmuch as 
the State did not produce evidence of either first or se<.ond 
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degree murder, the trial court should not have submitted such 
charges to the jury in the instructions given. Rather than re-
argue these points, suffice it to say that in Arugments Nos. 1 
and 2 herein, we have pointed out the following: 
The State did not produce any evidence that Matteri as-
saulted Delk which resulted in Delk's death. 
The State did not produce any evidence of malice afore-
thought. 
The State did not produce any evidence of willfulness, 
deliberation, premeditation, or specific intent on the part of 
11atteri to kill Delk. 
The State did not produce any evidence of Matteri's intent 
to do great bodily harm to Delk. 
Thus, the charges of first and second degree murder fail-
ing, and Matteri not being connected with the killing or with 
any assault on Delk, the following instructions should not have 
been given by the trial court to the jury: 
Instructions No.8 (Tr. 36, 3 7), which sets out the statutory 
definition of murder, wherein malice aforethought is required, 
and is defined. 
Instruction No. 9 (Tr. 37, 38), which distinguishes be-
tween first and second degree murder. 
Instruction No. 10 (Tr. 38, 39), which sets out the essen-
tial elements of first degree murder, including willfulness, de-
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Instruction No. 11 (Tr. 39), which sets out the essential 
elements of second degree murder, including malice afore-
thought and specific intent to do great bodily harm to Delk. 
Consequently, the trial court should have dismissed the 
two charges of first and second degree murder as moved by 
the Defendant (Tr. 385, 386), and should not have given the 
instructions enumerated. 
(C) After the jury had been deliberating several hours, 
the trial court c~lled in the jury to make inquiry concerning 
their progress (Tr. 390}. Mr. Christensen, the foreman, told 
the court that Instruction No. 15 was not clear (Tr. 391). After 
considerable explanation by the trial court on the matter of 
recommendations, Mr. Christensen, the jury foreman, pro-
ceeded further v;ith this question: "We ask the recommenda-
tions, just what is it-what we would like to know is how 
you look at it." (Tr. 392). 
In response, the trial court said (Tr. 392): "Oh, well, 
what that means-now, I tell the jury now that I will make 
investigations before I act one way or the other. If you make 
recommendations, all you do is to untie my hands so that 1 may 
not Ofder the defendant executed. If you do not sign that, 
then you do not permit me to make any investigation or to de-
termine. I can't tell you now what I am going to do because 
I don't know. I would need more information than I now have 
before I v.rould act in a matter of this weighty importance. I 
have ways and means of securing information that this jury 
would not have, but you do not tie my hands nor compel me to 
follow your recommendations. You merely give me the right 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to do it if after making an investigation I feel that it should 
be done, then I can, but I am not obligated to." 
However, the question Mr. Christensen asked was for 
the purpose of obtaining from the trial court his opinion as 
what he would do in the event a recommendation was made 
by the jury. But the trial court, in answering, took this occa-
sion to make an elaborate statement as to how he would reach 
a decision in the event the jury brought in a verdict of murder 
in the first degree and recommended a life sentence, which 
statement was uncalled for and gave the jury information to 
which it was not entitled. 
In addition, the explanation quoted above misled the jury, 
particularly that part of it in which the trial court stated that 
he would need more "information than I now have before I 
would act in a matter of this weighty importance." When the 
trial court made this statement, he had as much evidence as 
the jury had on which to base a judgment; but by telling the 
members of the jury that he needed further information, he 
led them to believe that they did not have all the facts. There-
fore, they were willing to take the trial court at his word that 
he had ways and means of obtaining information that the i 1 
jury would not have. Thus, the jury brought in a verdict of 
first degree murder with a recommendation, instead of a lesser 
degree of homicide, which they might well have done, had 
the trial court not told them that he had ways and means 
of obtaining information which the jury did not have, and 
that he needed more information than had come out in the 
trial. 
As the result of the erroneous instructions given the jury 
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by the trial court, as fully set out above, prejudicial error oc-
curred. For this reason, the trial court should have granted 
Defendant's motion for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT NO. 4 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE OR THE LAW. 
The Defendant contends that the jury's verdict of guilty 
of murder in the first degree, against Fred Matteri, is totally 
unsupported by the evidence produced by the State, and was 
contrary to the law of the case as contained in the trial court's 
instructions. 
Particular attention is called to the trial court's instruction 
No. 10 (Tr. 38) wherein nine elements of the crime charged 
against this Defendant must be proved in order to warrant a 
conviction of murder in the first degree. 
(A) In the first item, the jury was instructed that they 
must find "that on or about the 30th day of April, 1949, ... 
the defendant, Fred !vfatteri, killed Levi P. Delk." However, 
as shown in Arguments Nos. 1 and 2 herein, there was abso-
lutely no evidence whatsoever to support such a contention. 
Nothing linked Matteri personally, with Delk personally, at 
the time of the alleged homicide, or at any other time. Thus, 
the jury found that Matteri killed Delk in spite of this complete 
lack of evidence. 
(B) The fifth requirement of Instruction No. 10 is that 
the killing was deliberate. In the fourth paragraph of In-
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struction No. 14, "deliberate" is defined as a "cool state of 
blood and not a sudden passion. It connotes the commission 
of a crime under circumstances in which the perpetrator weighs 
the motives for his act, its consequences and its nature, and 
all other circumstances upon which his decision to commit 
such act is based." 
As argued in Argument No. 1 herein, there was a total 
absence of evidence of Matteri' s state of mind at the time of 
the alleged homicide, for nowhere in the record is there evi-
dence of any actions which could be interpreted as "delibera-
tion" or otherwise. There was no evidence that he was in a 
cool state of blood, or that he weighed the motives for any act, 
or its consequences and nature. Thus, there was no evidence 
which would support a conclusion that Matteri had "delib-
erately" committed any act involving Delk. The jury completely 
disregarded the court's instruction in so finding. 
(C) The sixth requirement as set out in Instruction No. 10 
1s that the killing was with malice aforethought. ''Malice 
aforethought" is defined in Instruction No. 8 (Tr. 36) as pre-
existing malice. "Malice" means that condition of mind which 
prompts a person to do a wrongful act intentionally, without 
justification or excuse. 
However, in considering the evidence produced by the 
State, there was none showing Matteri did a wrongful act 
intentionally, insofar as homicide is concerned. As 1.rgued 
heretofore, there was no evidence whatsoever connecting him 
and Delk personally. In regard to "aforethought," again we 
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the alleged offense. But again, as argued in Arguments Nos. 
1 and 2, there was no evidence of a state of mind at such a time. 
Consequently, the jury had absolutely no evidence to find 
that Matteri did any act connected with the alleged killing with 
"malice aforethought," or "preexisting malice." Thus, the 
finding of the jury was totally unsupported by the evidence, and 
was contrary to the law of the case as contained in the trial 
court's instructions. 
(D) The seventh requirement of first degree murder as 
contained in Instruction No. 10, is that said killing was pre-
meditated. "Premeditate" is defined in Instruction 14 as the 
"act of meditating, contriving, or designing beforehand and 
for any length of time. The time must be sufficient, however, 
for some reflection on and consideration of the act in contem-
plation during which the alternative choices of killing and 
not killing are debated in the mind of the actor and for the 
formation of a definite purpose to kill." 
Again, all that can be said is that such evidence is totally 
lacking, as set forth in Argument No. 1. There is a complete 
absence of any evidence which would show that Matteri medi-
tated, contrived or designed beforehand, or for that matter, 
at any time, the death of Delk. :Nor is there any evidence which 
the jury could possibly find that Matteri reflected upon the 
act of killing, or that he debated in his mind, or that he formed 
a definite purpose to kill. 
Thus, the jury, in finding that Matteri premeditated the 
act of killing Delk, did so in the face of absolutely no evidence 
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(E) The eighth element as contained in Instruction No. 
10 is that the killing was the result of a specific intention on the 
part of Fred Matteri to take the life of Delk. "Specific intent" 
is defined in Instruction No. 14 as "a fixed direction of the 
mind to a particular object or a determination to act in a par-
ticular manner." 
Again, we are compelled to repeat that there was a total 
lack of Matteri's mental state. Nowhere in the record is there 
evidence that Matteri ever had a "fixed direction of the mind" 
toward Delk, or a "determination to act" in any manner toward 
Delk, either to take his life or in regard to any other thing 
concerning him. 
Inasmuch as the State failed in this particular, the jury was 
totally unwarranted in finding such specific intent. Again, the 
finding was contrary to the evidence and the law of the case. 
To summarize Argument No. 4, we find that the jury dis-
regarded the evidence and the law of the case in the following 
particulars: (A) In finding that Matteri killed Delk; (B) In 
finding that the killing was deliberate; (C) In finding that the 
killing was with malice aforethought; (D) in finding that the 
killing was premeditated; (E) In finding that the killing was 
the result of a specific intention on the part of Fred Matteri 
to take the life of Delk. 
Thus, in five particulars, the jury disregarded the evidence 
and the law of the case. Had the jury done so in only one of 
the foregoing items, it would be sufficient to warrant a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT NO. 5 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISRE~ 
GARDING THE JURY'S RECOM~fENDATION OF LIFE 
IMPRISONlvfENT. 
) 
Section 103-28-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943, in provid-
ing the penalty for murder, reads as follows: 
"Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall 
suffer death, or, upon the recommendation of the jury, may 
be imprisoned at hard labor in the state prison for life, in the 
discretion of the court." 
This Court, in State vs. Markham '(1941), 112 P. (2) 
496, held that where a Defendant is convicted of murder in 
the first degree with a recommendation for life imprisonment, 
it is not mandatory on the trial court to follow such recom-
mendation, but the arbitrary exercise of this discretionary 
power of the trial court is reviewable. 
Defendant contends that the trial ·court abused its dis-
cretionary powers in this case, when it disregarded the recoln-
mendation of the jury. 
If ever there was a case with little or no evidence to support 
the charge against an accused, this is it. As shown in the 
foregoing arguments, evidence was completely lacking in sup-
port of essential elements of first degree murder. To call it 
a case of circumstantial evidence supporting first degree murder, 
is to give it a dignity to which it is not entitled. 
Undoubtedly, it was because of the skimpy case presented 
by the State that the jury recommended. life imprisonment. 
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In addition, as explained in Argument No. 3 (C) herein, the 
jury was concerned with how the trial court would look at 
the recommendation of life imprisonment. Having been 
assured by the trial court that he had access to information not 
available to the jury, it reached a verdict at once of first degree 
murder, with a recommendation of life imprisonment. It might 
well have been that the jury would have brought in a second 
degree murder conviction in place of first degree, had it not 
been for the reassurance given by the trial court that he had 
other means of ascertaining the facts relating to the Defendant. 
However, the trial court, in preparing the Defendant for 
the sentence which he intended to impose, made it very clear 
at the time the jury announced its verdict and recommendation, 
that he expected the Defendant to make a statement the court 
would believe, if he hoped at all to receive any mercy from 
him (Tr. 395, 396). But the trial court was not entirely clear 
as to just what he expected the Defendant to tell him, until 
Mr. Fratto, one of Defendant's counsel, was pleading for his 
life at the time of sentence ( T r. 400) . In response to Mr. 
Fratto's plea, the trial court said: 
"Except that he (the Defendant) must stand the full 
inferences. That is the only thing I can say, that while I hold 
that not against him, if he should avoid the inferences that the 
evidence shows, the burden is on him to tell how he got that 
possession (of the truck and watch), if he is not guilly as 
charged and as found." (Italics ours.) 
In other words, the trial court said that if the Defendant, 
after having been convicted by a jury of twelve men, could say 
something to the court which he would believe, to convince 
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him that he, the Defendant, "is not guilty as charged and as 
found," he would then become the subject of leniency in the 
eyes of the trial court. 
In view of the basis upon which the jury undoubtedly 
predicated its recommendation, and the further attitude of the 
trial court in asking that the Defendant convince him that he 
(the Defendant) was not guilty as charged and as found, the 
Defendant submits without further argun1ent, that this was 
abuse of discretion-gross abuse, and that the sentence of 
execution pronounced by the trial court is reviewable, and 
should be reversed by this Honorable Court. 
SUMMARY 
By way of recapitulation, the Defendant summarizes the 
foregoing arguments as follows: 
1. The State produced absolutely no evidence of first 
degree murder against this Defendant. 
A. The record contains no evidence of premeditation, 
deliberation, malice aforethought, or specific intent 
to kill Delk. 
B. Express malice, essential to prove first degree mur-
der, is totally lacking. 
C. The State completely failed to produce evidence 
that the Defendant committed the alleged assault 
that resulted in death. 
2. The State produced no evidence of second degree mur-
der against the Defendant. 
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A. There is no evidence of an intention or design by 
Matteri to cause great bodily injury to Delk. 
B. There is no evidence of malice aforethought. 
C. There is no evidence that Matteri killed Delk. 
3. The trial court misdirected the jury in matters of law 
to the prejudice of the Defendant. 
A. In instructing the jury that should there be reason-
able doubt as to whch of two or more degrees the 
Defendant is guilty, the jury can find Defendant 
guilty only of the lowest degree, the trial court 
erred; it should have used must as provided in 
Section 105-32-5, Utah Code Annotated 1943, and 
as proposed by the Defendant. 
B. Inasmuch as the State failed to produce evidence 
of either first or second degree murder, the trial 
court should not have submitted those charges to 
the jury, and should not have given the jury in-
structions thereon. 
C. The comments of the trial court to the jury that 
he had ways and means of securing information that 
the jury did not have, gave the jury information to 
which it was not entitled, and it was misled thereby. 
4. The jury's verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree 
is not supported by the law nor the evidence. 
A. There is no evidence that Matteri killed Delle 
B. There is no evidence of deliberation. 
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C. There is no evidence of malice aforethought. 
D. There is no evidence of premeditation. 
E. There is no evidence that Matteri had specific intent 
to kill Delk. 
5. The trial court abused its discretion when it disre-
garded the recommendation of the jury that Defendant be 
imprisoned for life, and sentenced him to be executed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In view of the foregoing arguments, we cannot avoid 
reaching the following conclusions: ( 1) The State totally failed 
to prove a case of first degree murder against the Defendant; 
( 2) The State did not even prove a case of second degree 
murder against the Defendant; and ( 3) The trial court grossly 
abused its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to be 
executed, in the face of a recommendation of life imprison-
ment, made by the jury at the time it brought in its verdict. 
Consequently, the trial court should have granted De-
fendant's motion to dismiss the charge of first degree murder 
against Fred Matteri. Having not done so, then it was the 
duty of the trial court to direct the jury to bring in a verdict 
of not guilty to the first and second degree murder charges,· as 
moved by counsel for the Defendant. Having done neither, 
and having misdirected the jury in matters of law, as herein 
set forth, and the jury having brought in a verdict of first 
degree murder completely unsupported by the law and the evi-
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dence of the case, it was incumbent upon the trial court to 
grant Defendant's motion for a new trial. 
Thus, counsel for the Defendant urges this Honorable 
Court to remand this case to the trial court with instructions 
to dismiss the charges of first and second degree murder. 
Should it be that the conviction of Fred Matteri be sus-
tained, then counsel for Defendant urges this Honorable Court 
to remand this case to the trial court with instructions to follow 
the recommendation of the jury, and re-sentence the Defendant 
to life imprisonment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, 
GORDON B. CHRISTENSON, 
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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